Norfolk Emergency Response Guidance 2014

Version 5.0
Author NRF Emergency Capability Workstream
Reviewed by NRF Membership
Authorised by NRF Executive Group
Next review date August 2015
Foreword

The purpose of this guidance document is to outline the agreed procedures and arrangements for effective integrated multi-agency command, control and coordination when dealing with all phases of emergencies in the County. Individual plans and procedures adopted by each of the emergency services, local authorities and other key agencies involved in the response are understandably devoted to the role of the service concerned.

In preparing this document the authors have recognised that each emergency is different and has its own unique features. The guidance contained in this document is designed to offer a framework within which those responsible for the successful resolution of emergencies can work together with maximum efficiency. It follows the principles of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 as documented within the non-statutory guidance “Emergency Response and Recovery” and the existing well-established practice of the Norfolk Resilience Forum that states an integrated approach to emergency management should be taken.

The Norfolk Emergency Response Guidance will form the basis of integrated emergency management training and exercises undertaken within the County and will be reviewed annually. The principles outlined in this document should, as far as possible be adopted at any emergency requiring an integrated multi-agency response.

Signature

Phil Kirby
Broadland District Council Chief Executive
Chair of the Norfolk Resilience Forum Executive
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Purpose

The purposes of the arrangements outlined in this guidance are to ensure the:

- Protection of the health and safety of responding personnel
- Saving and protecting of human life
- Relief of suffering
- Containment of the emergency – limiting its escalation or spread and mitigating its impacts
- The protection of property (as far as reasonably practicable)
- Provision to the public and businesses of warnings, advice and information
- Safeguarding of the environment
- Maintenance and restoration of critical activities
- Maintenance of normal services at an appropriate level
- Facilitation of investigations and inquiries (e.g. by preserving the scene and effectively managing records)
- The promotion and facilitation of self-help in affected communities
- Facilitation of the recovery of the community (including mitigating the humanitarian, economic, infrastructure and environmental impacts)
- Evaluation of the response and recovery effort
- Identification of and taking action to implement lessons identified during the evaluation

Extract from Emergency Response and Recovery 2.5.4
Protocols

This guidance will take effect August 2014. It will be reviewed annually. This process will be advanced should legislation, best practice guidance change or if lessons are identified following activation for an emergency or exercise. The master copy of this document and a record of the review and decision-making process will be held by the NRF Business Manager, and will be made available for audit as necessary. Contributing organisations are asked to notify the NRF Business Manager of any changes that may impact on the content or procedures outlined in this guidance. Prior to publication, the Norfolk Resilience Forum will consider all amendments to this guidance.

Activation of Guidance

This guidance provides the principles which should, as far as possible, be adopted at any emergency requiring an integrated multi agency response.

Plan Amendments

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NRF Business Manager
As care of Joint Specialist Operations
Norfolk Constabulary, OCC, Falcons Chase
Wymondham, NR18 0WW
Email: nrf@norfolk.pnn.police.uk
# Records of Guidance Validation and Training Schedule

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<td>Environment Agency</td>
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<td>EEAST</td>
<td>East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust</td>
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<td>ECA</td>
<td>Emergency Controlling Authority</td>
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<td>Environmental Health Officer</td>
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<td>EPDO</td>
<td>Emergency Planning Duty Officer, Norfolk County Council (also known as Resilience Team Duty Officer)</td>
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<td>EPRR</td>
<td>Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response</td>
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<td>FCP</td>
<td>Forward Command Post</td>
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<td>FLO</td>
<td>Family Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Fire and Rescue Service</td>
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<td>GLO</td>
<td>Government Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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<td>HAC</td>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance Centre</td>
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<td>Hazardous Area Response Team</td>
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<td>Health and Safety Executive</td>
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<td>High Integrity Telecommunications System</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>Incident Control Point</td>
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<td>Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme</td>
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<td>JDM</td>
<td>Joint Decision Model</td>
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<td>Joint Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Lead Government Department</td>
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<td>Local Resilience Forum</td>
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<td>MACA</td>
<td>Military Aid to the Civil Authorities</td>
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<td>Major Accident Control Regulations (Joint Services Protocol 498)</td>
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<td>MAIB</td>
<td>Marine Accident Investigation Branch</td>
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<td>Multi-Agency Support Group East</td>
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<td>Multi-Agency Strategic Holding Area</td>
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<td>Maritime Coastguard Agency</td>
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<td>Mobile Telecommunications Privilege Access Scheme</td>
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<td>NT</td>
<td>National Trust</td>
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<td>Norfolk County Council</td>
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<td>National Health Service</td>
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<td>Norfolk Resilience Forum</td>
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<td>POLSA</td>
<td>Police Search Advisors</td>
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<td>PPE</td>
<td>Personal Protective Equipment</td>
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<td>RAFRLO</td>
<td>Royal Air Force Regional Liaison Officer</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>RAIB</td>
<td>Rail Accident Investigation Branch</td>
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<td>RAYNET</td>
<td>Radio Amateurs Emergency Network</td>
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<td>RCG</td>
<td>Recovery Coordinating Group</td>
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<td>RT</td>
<td>Resilience Team, NCC</td>
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<td>RTC</td>
<td>Road Traffic Collision</td>
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<td>Resilience Team Duty Officer, Norfolk County Council</td>
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<td>RVP</td>
<td>Rendezvous Point</td>
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<td>RWG</td>
<td>Recovery Working Group</td>
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<td>SAGE</td>
<td>Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies</td>
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<td>SCC</td>
<td>Strategic Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
<td>Strategic Coordinating Group</td>
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<td>SHA</td>
<td>Strategic Holding Area</td>
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<td>SIM</td>
<td>Senior Identification Manager</td>
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<td>SIO</td>
<td>Senior Investigating Officer</td>
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<td>STAC</td>
<td>Science and Technical Advice Cell</td>
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<td>STEP</td>
<td>Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel</td>
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<td>TCG</td>
<td>Tactical Coordinating Group</td>
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<td>USAR</td>
<td>Urban Search and Rescue</td>
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<td>VCC</td>
<td>Voluntary Coordinating Cell</td>
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Section 1 - Introduction

Introduction

The risks to Norfolk are well documented in the Community Risk Register (CRR). Where required, plans have been prepared in respect of individual risks, for example Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) sites and those risks rated as “High” within the CRR. However, to augment these plans it is necessary to provide an overarching multi-agency document outlining how the emergency services, Local Authorities and other organisations will respond to emergencies.

Emergencies have similar characteristics on which this guidance is based. This document offers a framework within which those who are responsible for the successful resolution of an emergency are able to work together with maximum efficiency.

The guidance can equally be used for less serious emergencies which warrant a coordinated response from the agencies involved.

Definitions

In order to ensure that there is complete understanding of the phrases that are likely to be used, they are defined as follows:

a. Major Incident

An emergency that requires the implementation of special arrangements by one or more of the emergency services or any other Category 1 Responder for:

- The assessment and initial treatment, rescue and transport of a large number of casualties
- The involvement either directly or indirectly of large numbers of people
- The handling of a large number of enquiries likely to be generated from both the public and the news media, usually to the Police
- The need for the large scale combined resources of two or more of the emergency services or any other Category 1 Responder
- The mobilisation and organisation of the emergency services and supporting organisations e.g. Local Authority, to cater for the threat of death, serious injury or homelessness to a large number of people
It is vitally important that, when appropriate, a “major incident” is declared. This decision must be clear and communicated between all necessary agencies.

b. **Emergency**
   - An event or situation which threatens serious damage to human welfare in a place in the UK
   - An event or situation which threatens serious damage to the environment of a place in the UK
   - War or terrorism, which threatens serious damage to the security of the UK

Additionally, to constitute an emergency, an event or situation must also pose a considerable test for an organisation’s ability to perform its functions.

The common themes of emergencies are: the scale of the impact or the event or situation, the demands it is likely to make of local responders; and the exceptional deployment of resources.

c. **Critical Incident (Police Only)**

This definition is used by the Police to describe any emergency where the effectiveness of the Police response is likely to have a significant impact on the confidence of the victim, their family and/or the community. It is likely that during a major emergency the Police would incorporate their Critical Incident protocols in the response. However, this would not impact on the activities of other agencies.

d. **Response**

Response encompasses the decision and actions taken to deal with the immediate effects of an emergency. In most scenarios it is likely to be relatively short and to last a matter of hours – rapid implementation of arrangements for collaboration, coordination and communication, is vital. Response encompasses the effort to deal not only with the direct effects of the emergency itself (e.g. fighting fires, rescuing individuals) but also the indirect effects (e.g. disruption, media interest). It must be recognised that some emergencies can be protracted, lasting several days or even months. For example widespread flooding or outbreaks of animal or human diseases.
e. Recovery

In contrast, recovery may take months or even years to complete, as it seeks to support affected communities in the reconstruction of the physical infrastructure and restoration of emotional, social and physical well-being.

Recovery is defined as the process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency. Although distinct from the response phase, recovery should be addressed from the very beginning, as recovery actions taken during the response phase can influence the longer-term outcomes for a community.

Type and Scale

Incidents may be international, national, regional or local level in scale and generally fall into one of two categories:

a. Sudden Impact

These occur with little or no warning and require an immediate response. Examples of this could be significant transport collisions, fires or explosions.

b. Slow Onset

This type of event has a lead in time of days, weeks or months. It can include severe weather, flooding or pandemics.

Declaration

An emergency (as defined within the CCA) or a major emergency, can be declared by any of the Category 1 Responders, who consider that any of the criteria are satisfied. It is the responsibility of the agency making the declaration to ensure all others are notified.

It must be recognised that what is an emergency as defined within the CCA to one agency, may not be so to another. However all agencies would be notified, so that where appropriate, resources can be deployed in a stand by capacity if necessary.
Risk Assessment

a. Community Risk Register

A key requirement of the Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) is that the Local Resilience Forum (LRF) should produce a Community Risk Register (CRR) that provides a collective assessment of the hazards and risks within the LRF area.

The National Risk Register Assessment forms a platform from which the CRR is produced, the purpose of the CRR being to identify and quantify local risks.

This information is then used to inform the public, in addition to providing meaningful information to the NRF during its emergency planning, training and exercising activities.

The Norfolk CRR is a public document and is available on the NRF website at: www.norfolkprepared.gov.uk.

b. Integrated Emergency Plans

Wherever appropriate, specific multi-agency plans have been prepared for relevant sites or hazards within the County. These fall into various categories:

- For risks identified by the CRR process
- As required by COMAH Regulations
- As required by Major Accident Control Regulations (MACR)
- As required by Major Accident Hazard Pipeline Regulations
- Other site specific (e.g. Norwich International Airport)
- General occurrence (e.g. Norfolk Coastal Pollution Response Plan)
- General procedure (e.g. Norfolk Emergency Media Plan)

Business / Service Continuity

The Civil Contingencies Act requires Category 1 (see Appendix A) responders to maintain plans to ensure that they can continue to deliver their critical functions in the event of an emergency, so far as is reasonably practicable. The duty relates to all critical functions, not just their emergency response.
Through the Business Continuity Management (BCM) process, procedures should be developed to ensure that these critical activities are maintained within the agreed timescales. Plans should be developed and regularly reviewed.

Each agency should consider implications of its response on other organisations, to ensure that a coordinated response is achieved; this can be evaluated through multi-agency exercises.

Training and Exercising

The NRF undertakes a programme of multi-agency exercises and training events, these include:

- Table top exercises*
- Live Exercises*
- Multi-agency courses for Operational, Tactical and Strategic level attendees*
- Briefing Days and workshops

*Themes and scenarios for these events are drawn from the risks identified in the Norfolk Community Risk Register.
Section 2 - The Combined Response

Overall Objectives

a. Initial Responders
It is likely that the initial response to emergencies will be by the emergency services based in the County. Depending on the scale of the emergency, it is subsequently likely to involve other agencies/organisations from Norfolk, regional or national.
Individual agency roles and responsibilities are detailed in Appendix B.

b. Civil Contingencies Act
The Cabinet Office publication “Emergency Response and Recovery” provides a set of common objectives to which all responders should work; these objectives are located in the Purpose section of this plan.

Responders

a. Generally
The CCA designates agencies that would respond to an emergency as either Category 1 or Category 2.
Appendix A provides lists of Category 1 and 2 Responders.

b. Category 1
These are identified as the main agencies involved in most emergencies at the local level. The designation of Category 1 status also brings with it certain CCA obligations outside the scope of this document.

c. Category 2
These are the organisations that are likely to be involved in some types of emergencies, for example transport companies/utilities. If the emergency involves them, they will be expected to cooperate with the Category 1 Responders at all stages.
Other Organisations

In addition to the above responders, support is available from a number of other agencies.

a. **DCLG Response Co-ordination Group (ResCG)**

The purpose of the ResCG is to:

- Develop a shared understanding of the evolving situation (including horizon scanning)
- Assess the emergency’s actual and/or potential impact
- Review the steps being taken to manage the situation
- Gain information for the LGD and CCS
- Discuss mutual aid and any other assistance that may be needed /provided
- Identify any issues which cannot be resolved at a local level and need to be raised at national level (e.g. niche capability gaps)

b. **Multi-Agency Support Group (East)**

The Multi-Agency Support Group (East) (MASG (E)) exists between organisations that have responsibility for delivering goods, services, transport or logistics on which the public rely’s and which could be threatened or disrupted by a civil emergency or major emergency across multiple counties. The MASG(E) role is to establish and maintain situational awareness and co-ordinate the response of these organisations.

c. **The Insurance Industry**

Experience has identified the crucial role that the insurance industry will play. Although their role is seen as focused on the recovery element, it will be of great benefit if they are engaged in the early response. This will allow them to provide respondents with an overview of how they will assist those affected and any preliminary activity that would be of benefit during the response and recovery.

As a result, the Association of British Insurers (ABI) and Chartered Institute of Loss Adjusters (CILA) will nominate a single point of contact to act on behalf of the industry, to facilitate effective information exchange the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG) will also nominate a point of contact.
A member of the industry should be invited to join the Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG). See Norfolk Recovery Guidance document.

d. Community
Communities play a vital role in the response to, and recovery from emergencies. They can provide resources, expertise and knowledge to support the responding agencies. Members of the community may be able to help themselves and can also provide support to local vulnerable people who may need physical assistance or reassurance. The community may be able to advise response agencies on the different cultural or language needs of its members.

Within Norfolk there are pre-existing local networks. They can be a valuable source of information and can be utilised for the dissemination of information. Community groups can assist in preparedness measures, for example in disseminating how to respond appropriately in an emergency.

These include:
- Elected Members
- Parish & Town Councils and Neighbourhood Management Teams
- Community Emergency Coordinators/Volunteers
- Safer Neighbourhood initiatives and partnership
- Community Response Plans
- Voluntary & Faith Groups
- Local business groups including town/city centre partnerships

e. Voluntary & Faith Groups
The voluntary sector has an important role to play in supporting the statutory services in response to many emergencies. A number of local and national voluntary organisations actively engage with the NRF via the Voluntary & Faith Sub-group.

The CCA describes such organisations as those that "carry on any activities for the purpose of preventing emergencies, reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of emergencies, or taking other action in connection with emergencies"
A memorandum of understanding has been written to record the principles of an arrangement between the NRF and the Voluntary and Faith Sector. In support of this arrangement, a Voluntary Coordination Cell (VCC) can be established to engage in an emergency response at a Tactical level and coordinate the involvement of voluntary sector organisations.

f. Spontaneous Volunteers
Experience has shown that in the aftermath of a major emergency, spontaneous volunteers, often called “convergent volunteers”, will arrive at the scene of an emergency and want to offer their skills. These individuals will not be affiliated to any specific organisation.

At this time there are no protocols in place for making use of spontaneous volunteers and responders must be cognisant of health and safety and insurance issues if it is decided to take up their offers of help.

Until such time as procedures are in place it is suggested that the Local Authority, working with the established Voluntary sector organisations, takes the responsibility for coordinating these volunteers.

g. Commercial Companies
As well as those commercial companies covered by the CCA as Category 2 responders, there are a number of other companies who are likely to be involved with the response to major emergencies, due to either other legislation such as COMAH, or the nature of their business. It is important to identify and engage with any commercial companies where additional support or resources are likely to be involved or where there is a need for direct involvement in the command and control structure as well as the sharing key information.

Companies may establish their own help line for staff and their families as well as a media plan with associated communications staff.

Both will need to take into account and may need to be incorporated into the structures of the response to ensure that key information with regards to staff involved, such as casualties or missing persons, is not lost and in making sure there is consistency in key media messages.
Transport companies have additional resources available for the response to major emergencies. Most major airlines have contracts in place to deal with the loss of aircraft and the possible need for temporary mortuary facilities as well as staff to assist with the management of survivors and families. Similar support for survivors and families is provided by the Rail Care Team for rail emergencies. In both cases the teams are trained to work in support of the emergency responders at the scene and at casualty locations, such as hospitals - a system will need to be provided to allow suitable access where possible for such teams.

A further example of the involvement of commercial companies is with regard to coastal pollution emergencies where the company involved or its insurance representative, have arranged the required clean-up operations rather than the responsibility falling to the Local Authority and subsequently undergoing a cost recovery process.

h. Community NHS Trusts

Community NHS Trusts would provide a significant role in assisting the management of emergency situations by caring for patients at home or in community hospitals. This would release capability in Acute Hospitals to enable them to manage mass casualties and prevent people from being admitted and needing an ambulance. In addition they could provide nursing requirements into rest centres if required.

i. Norfolk County Council Adult Social Care

Will take the lead in managing the provision of social care for vulnerable adults who have been affected by the incident and are in need of such services.
Will take the lead in managing the situation if vulnerable adults cannot be cared for by their usual individual or organisational carer as a result of the incident
Will work with partners in Health to provide Mental Health Social Care Services to those vulnerable adults who are in need of such services.

j. Norfolk County Council Children’s Services

Will take the lead if Norfolk County Council becomes a Corporate Parent to children, because local authorities are responsible for looking after children who cannot be cared for by their parents (e.g. if orphaned).
Will provide recovery assistance to schools if necessary, specifically recovery of sufficient pupil places in schools following a major incident and the associated recovery in pupil learning.

The Critical Incident Team provides support in schools and settings for children suffering psychological trauma as the result of a major incident.

In the medium to long term following a major incident Children's Services works with partners in Health to provide Child & Adolescent Mental Health Services (CAMHS) to those children and young people who have been affected.

Some schools have been identified as Rest Centres by the districts.
Section 3 - Initial Actions of First Responders at Scene

General

The importance of the role of the first responder at the scene of an emergency cannot be overstated. An accurate early assessment of the situation will facilitate the deployment of appropriate resources and the setting up of necessary command and control structures at the earliest opportunity.

Risk Assessment

Prior to the deployment of personnel to an emergency all agencies must perform a dynamic risk assessment pertinent to their requirements, service control rooms will ensure that the most appropriate resources are dispatched and inform them of hazards likely to be encountered, based on early information from the scene. For example, wind direction and details of substances involved may influence the direction of approach to a fire or chemical emergency.

The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP) protocol recommends that agencies should undertake a joint risk assessment at the scene, this will allow for a "shared situational awareness" between responders.

Locations where there are known hazards may have pre-designated approach routes, Rendezvous Point(s) and Forward Command Post(s) which are identified in the various contingency plans. Additionally, Norfolk Fire and Rescue Service vehicles have access to site and floor plans and risk information for many premises which can be viewed and or printed off via a mobile data terminal situated within the fire appliance.
STEP 1-2-3+ (Safety Triggers for Emergency Personnel)

Although designed for the initial response to a deliberate release of chemical biological, radiological, nuclear or explosive (CBRNE) materials, the STEP 1-2-3+ methodology may be appropriate for initial responders when making their first scene assessment.
Others

In most emergencies Fire and Rescue, Police and Ambulance services will be the first responders at the scene. Where other services, such as the Maritime Coastguard Agency (MCA) are present they will follow their standard operating procedures, all the time being aware of the specific hazards of the emergency and taking advice as necessary.

Briefing

It is essential that responders are provided with comprehensive briefing regarding the nature of the emergency and role required of them. In the early stages this is likely to be quite limited; therefore Commanders must ensure that a mechanism to provide regular briefings is implemented as soon as possible.

Ideally briefings should:

- Be concise
- Include relevant information
- Where necessary, include intelligence and legal issues
- Include strategy / Tactical plan
- Include health and safety information
- Include specific duties
- Detail feedback loop

One particular approach to briefing is undertaken by Norfolk Constabulary, further details of the IIMARCH process can be found on: [www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/briefing-and-debriefing/](http://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/operations/briefing-and-debriefing/)
Section 4 - Command, Control and Coordination

Introduction
This section introduces the framework for the management of the emergency response effort; this will be undertaken at one or more of three ascending levels: Operational, Tactical and Strategic.

Emergencies of the “sudden impact” type will start from operational level at the scene and be escalated as necessary.

For a slow onset emergency such as a threat of flooding, command levels may be activated as required.

See Appendix L which illustrates a typical command structure which could be established for an emergency.

Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP)

JESIP is focused on the interoperability of the Police, Fire and Ambulance Services in the early stages of a major or complex incident. However, the principles described within JESIP can also be applied to the full range of emergency responders and to smaller scale incidents, wide area emergencies and pre-planned operations.

The aim of the JESIP process is to create a “shared situation awareness” between the responding organisations. JESIP incorporates the following process of principles for joint working.
**Principles for Joint Working**

1. **Co-locate**
   - Co-locate with commanders as soon as practically possible at a single, safe and easily identified location near to the scene.

2. **Communicate**
   - Communicate clearly using plain English

3. **Co-ordinate**
   - Co-ordinate by agreeing the lead service. Identify priorities, resources and capabilities for an effective response, including the timing of further meetings

4. **Jointly understand risk**
   - Jointly understand risk by sharing information about the likelihood and potential impact of threats and hazards to agree potential control measures.

5. **Shared Situational Awareness**
   - Shared Situational Awareness established by using METHANE and the Joint Decision Model
In order to create a “shared situational awareness” it is imperative, that in the early stages, information is passed between emergency responders and their control rooms using a standard format. This process should follow the METHANE mnemonic:

One of the difficulties facing Commanders from different organisations in a joint emergency response is how to bring together the available information, reconcile objectives and then make effective joint decisions. To enable this, the following Joint Decision Model (JDM) has been developed.
Further information can be obtained from: [www.jesip.org.uk](http://www.jesip.org.uk)
Definitions

a. **Command**

Command is the exercise of vested authority that is associated with a role or rank within an organisation, to give direction in order to achieve defined objectives.

b. **Control**

Control is the application of authority, combined with the capability to manage resources, in order to achieve defined objectives. Some organisations define command and control together, but the key element of control is the combination of authority with the means to ensure command intent is communicated and results monitored. While command cannot be exercised by one organisation over another, the authority to exercise control of an organisation’s personnel or assets, for a specified time period to attain defined objectives, can be granted or delegated to another organisation. This granting of control does not imply that the responsibility for those resources has been transferred.

c. **Coordination**

Coordination is the integration of multi-agency efforts and available capabilities, which may be interdependent, in order to achieve defined objectives. The coordination function will be exercised through control arrangements, and requires that command of individual organisations’ personnel and assets is appropriately exercised in pursuit of the defined objectives.

d. **Subsidiarity**

Decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level, with coordination at the highest necessary level; local agencies are the building blocks of the response to, and recovery from, an emergency of any scale.

e. **Direction**

Clarity of purpose comes from a Strategic aim and supporting objectives that are agreed, understood and sustained by all involved. This will enable the prioritisation and focus of the response and recovery effort.
Operational Level

This is the level at which the hands-on work is undertaken at the site(s) of the emergency or other associated areas.

Operational Commanders or managers will concentrate their effort and resources on the specific tasks within their areas of responsibility. They will act on delegated responsibility from their organisations until higher levels of management are established (if required).

Agencies retain control of their own resources and personnel deployed at the scene, but each agency must liaise and cooperate with all other agencies involved to ensure a coherent and integrated effort.

These arrangements will usually be adequate to deal with most events or situations, but, if events demand greater planning, coordination or resources, additional tiers of management may be necessary.

A key function of an Operational Commander or Manager will be to consider whether circumstances warrant a Tactical level of management.

Tactical Level

a. Purpose

If activated, the purpose of the Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) is to ensure that the actions taken by the Operational level are coordinated, coherent and integrated, in order to achieve maximum effectiveness and efficiency. It will usually comprise Tactical Commanders from each agency committed within the area of operations, and will undertake Tactical coordination of the response to the event or situation. It is important to understand that the position of Tactical Commander is role specific and not rank related.
The role of the TCG is to:

- Fulfil Strategic aims and objectives
- Keep SCG informed
- Determine priorities for allocating available resources
- Obtain additional resources if required
- Plan and coordinate how and when tasks will be undertaken
- Assess significant risks and use this to inform the tasking of Operational Commanders
- Ensure the health and safety of the public and personnel

(Emergency Response and Recovery Section 4.2.13)

Appendix D provides a summary of critical issues that the TCG may need to consider when forming a Tactical plan.

TCG representatives must, wherever possible, be empowered to make decisions appropriate to that level. Unless there is an obvious and urgent need for intervention, TCG should not become directly involved in the detailed Operational tasks being discharged by Operational Commanders.

b. Location

The scale of the emergency will dictate the appropriate venue from where the emergency can be coordinated. This may be near to the scene or at another venue such as a Police Station. See Appendix D for further guidance.

There are a number of pre-identified TCG facilities at key locations. These are Police Stations at Wymondham (OCC), Great Yarmouth, Kings Lynn, North Walsham and Norwich. These sites can be used to coordinate the Tactical response for any emergency.

When an emergency occurs without a specific scene, a TCG may still be required to deliver effective multi-agency coordination.

It may not be practical to locate representatives at a formal TCG as it may be impractical for them to travel (even contravening the advice given to the public). In this instance the potential for teleconference or video conferencing should be considered.
c. Meetings

TCG meetings should be held on a regular basis and where practicable, if established, timed around any Strategic meeting structures. This coordination of meeting times is sometimes referred to as the “Battle Rhythm”.

Some agencies, (for example, the LA), may prefer to operate from administrative offices, but will send liaison officers to the TCG in order to enhance coordination.

A specimen TCG Agenda is attached at Appendix F.

Strategic Level

a. Overview

Where an event or situation has an especially significant impact, substantial resource implications, involves a large number of organisations, or lasts for an extended duration; then it may be necessary to implement multi-agency management at the Strategic level.

The multi-agency forum which brings together Executive level Commanders from relevant organisations is entitled the Strategic Coordinating Group (SCG)

The SCG establish the strategy and framework within which Operational and Tactical managers work, in responding to and recovering from emergencies.

The SCG looks at the wider influences and long term impact of the emergency on the areas affected and will work to maintain day-to-day services as close to normal as possible.

The SCG also supports the activities undertaken at Operational and Tactical levels, and in addition has the role of providing financial support for the emergency response. Any requests to neighboring counties and Central Government for assistance in the form of mutual aid would be made by the SCG.

Priorities for the future actions of each of the organisations will be decided.
Within this forum, the strategy to tackle any resulting problems should be formed, each of the attending agencies will have its own objectives and the SCG role is to avoid potential conflicts.

Strategic coordination should be seen as standard practice not the exception. It is easy to dismantle if not required and this approach removes the potential for the TCG to be reluctant to ask for a Strategic level of management and command.

The decision to establish an SCG could in practice occur following dialogue between key partners with regard to the prevailing and potential circumstances of the emergency, and this will result in a joint decision being made. This decision making process is likely to be coordinated by the Police or Local Authority. In the event of a Severe Flood Warning being issued or a predicted tidal surge an SCG will be automatically triggered.

It will usually be the role of the Police to coordinate this management level and chair the SCG. The role of the SCG chair, is to exercise coordination, not a command function.

This would be particularly appropriate where there are significant public order implications. However, depending on the nature of the emergency, this role may be undertaken by another agency. In particular, during a notifiable animal disease outbreak, the lead authority will be DEFRA and the NRF Response should dovetail into this lead agency’s present plans.

b. Location

The SCG should be based at an appropriate location away from the scene. This will usually be at the headquarters of the lead service or organisation. In an emergency situation this will be known as the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). The location of the SCC may be reviewed if another agency takes the lead.

c. Purpose

The purpose of the SCG is to take overall responsibility for the multi-agency management of the emergency and to establish the policy and Strategic framework within which the TCG will work.
d. **Role**

- Determine and promulgate a clear Strategic aim and objectives and review them regularly
- Establish a policy framework for the overall management of the event or situation
- Prioritise the requirements of the Tactical tier and allocate personnel and resources accordingly
- Formulate and implement media handling and public communication plans, potentially delegating this to one responding agency
- Direct planning and operations beyond the immediate response, in order to facilitate the recovery process
- Ensure that legal advice is obtained if considered necessary
- Ensure that detailed policy records are maintained

e. **Strategy**

This is an important element of the response and should be determined, recorded and distributed as soon as practicable.

Specific Strategic aims will vary according to the scenario; however they are likely to reflect the following themes:
- Save human life
- Welfare of responders
- Security
- Investigation
- Transport
- Timely advice to public and businesses
- Community impact & protection of the environment
- Early consideration of recovery issues

f. **Membership**

The requirement for Strategic management may not apply to all responding agencies. However, emergencies are invariably multi-agency and rarely remain within the remit of a single agency.
It may therefore be appropriate for an agency, not involved at Strategic level, to send liaison officers to SCG meetings. SCG members should, wherever possible, be empowered to make executive decisions in respect of their organisation’s resources. In any case, representatives must be able to obtain decisions quickly.

The following organisations would normally, subject to the type of emergency, be represented at the SCG:

- Police
- Fire and Rescue
- Ambulance
- Local Authority
- Environment Agency
- Maritime and Coastguard Agency
- National Commissioning Board Local Area Team (NHS)
- Military
- DCLG (RED)
- Voluntary & Faith Representative

It must be noted that each organisation retains control of its own operations and the SCG has to rely on a process of discussion and consensus to reach decisions.

For this to be achieved every member of the SCG must have a clear understanding of the roles / responsibilities and constraints of the other participants. See Appendix B.

In addition, members must be cognisant of their own resilience and ensure they have the necessary support and relief arrangements.
g. Security Screening

Dialogue at the SCG level could at times involve subject matter of a sensitive or security marked content. It is therefore imperative that personnel delegated to attend these meetings have been security vetted to an appropriate level.

As a general approach, SCG attendees should be vetted to at least the level of Non-Police Personnel Vetting level 2 (NPPV level 2).

For further guidance regarding security markings and vetting, refer to the Government Security Classifications (Cabinet Office – April 2014)

h. SCG Meetings

The format and frequency of SCG meetings will be determined by the scale and nature of the event. In a fast developing situation the SCG may convene frequently. However duration of meetings must be kept short, to allow attendees to attend to their other responsibilities. A maximum duration of 30 minutes per meeting is considered best practice.

In other cases the SCG may meet daily or weekly (or via a teleconference facility) to receive updates and confirm existing strategy and policy decisions.

All SCG meetings will be recorded and where practicable written records will be produced and distributed within 60 minutes. It is also recommended that agencies maintain their own policy logs.

A policy log will be maintained and retained for disclosure in legal proceedings if required.

A specimen SCG Agenda is attached at Appendix E.
i.  SCG Support Cells

In order to function effectively the SCG may require a number of support cells depending on the circumstances of the emergency. These could include:

- **Intelligence / Information**

It is recommended that a single reference point for all information and intelligence in respect of the emergency is set up as soon as possible. The collation, evaluation, analysis and sharing of a coherent information will enable informed decision making at all levels of command, but particularly at the Strategic level.

Experience has identified that the output of any intelligence cell should be published in a SitREP. This will present all relevant facts known at a point in time during a developing situation into a single document available to all agencies. It will be particularly useful when a Government Office(s) or COBR is involved.

- **Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)**

STAC is activated at the request of the SCG Chair and brings together a range of staff to collectively provide such scientific and technical advice. The specific composition will be dependent on the nature of the emergency.

The role of the STAC is to provide a single point of scientific advice to the members of the SCG on the scientific, technical, environmental and public health consequences of the emergency via a nominated STAC representative.

In addition, for incidents with a wider regional or national significance, the Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE) may be established at Government level.

Further guidance regarding the STAC is included at Appendix G.

- **Recovery**

It is important that the SCG ensures that the process for recovery is considered from the outset. Where deemed appropriate, the activation of a Recovery Coordinating Group (RCG) should be considered.
The early establishment of this group will ensure that at the appropriate time there will be a seamless transition from response to recovery with the appropriate change in coordination agency (usually from the Police to the Local Authority). This process should be documented (See Appendix I – Handover Certificate).

For further information regarding recovery, refer to the NRF Recovery Guidance document.

- **Other Support Cells**

In addition, a number of other cells may be required at the Strategic Coordination Centre (SCC). These can include:

- Voluntary Coordinating Cell
- Media and Communications (see section 9)
- Finance
- Legal
- Logistics
- Mass Fatalities Coordinating Group (Norfolk Mass Fatalities Plan)
- Community Impact Assessment
- Military
- Government Liaison

- **Combined Silver Air Cell (CSAC)**

Should air support assets be required during a major incident, it is imperative that their response is coordinated. With this in mind, a structure referred to as a Combined Silver Air Cell (CSAC) will be utilised.

The main role of the CSAC will be prioritisation of air tasking in accordance with the strategic intent and tactical objectives of the incident.

The CSAC would be formed of liaison officers and supporting staff from the various air support providers.

Further information, refer to the following document:
National Police Air Service, Combined Silver Air Cell, Standard Operating Procedures.

**Government Level**

Where the emergency warrants it, the SCG will report to the DCLG Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED) and Operations Centre through the Government Liaison Officer, who in turn will report to Government via the COBR.

It is highly likely that during the event, information will be required at a national level to allow for wider communications, planning and support activities to be undertaken. Reporting can take two forms: single agency (e.g. Police reporting through ACPO) or multi-agency (e.g. SCG reporting to COBR via the Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED)).

At Central Government level, the response and recovery may be overseen by the Prime Minister and/or other Ministers sitting at COBR.

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) can be sought when there is an urgent need to help to deal with an emergency arising from a natural disaster or major incident. The Joint Regional Liaison Officer from the local Army Brigade Headquarter will be able to give advice and should be contacted in the first instance. See Appendix C for more detail.

**Local Authority**

The Local Authority would not necessarily be present at the scene, although relevant LA plans and procedures may be activated, in the early stages of an emergency. However, there are significant benefits if a Liaison Officer represents Local Authority interest at the forward command post, if established. LA Liaison Officers should be clearly identifiable and be equipped with their own communications.

The Local Authority may be called to attend the scene where certain expertise is required, such as Building Control Officers, Environment Health Officers and Trading Standard Officers.

**Cost Recovery**

It is imperative that accurate records are kept of expenditure during the “response phase”. These records would be required should subsequent claims for reimbursement be progressed via processes such as insurance claims or the Bellwin Scheme.
Debriefing and Follow Up

Debriefing of all personnel should be regarded as an integral element of the response to an emergency. The purpose being not to apportion blame, but to identify the most and least effective aspects of the response and any lessons identified. Debriefings should be structured, and make best use of open questions to encourage participation.

A good debriefing will gather information and intelligence and identify:

- What went well and why (good practice)
- What did not go well and why (shortfalls, malfunctions)
- Identify areas for improvement, what would be done differently next time
- Provide recognition and praise as appropriate

For multiagency debriefs, it is anticipated that the monitoring of the progress of the agreed action log would be undertaken by the NRF Risk Workstream Capability Executive Lead.

In addition, the use of “hot debriefing” immediately after the emergency is an effective forum to ensure all points from responders have been gathered. It provides a useful opportunity to address urgent Operational and welfare issues.

It is anticipated that debriefing will occur at SCG, TCG and Operational levels, reports containing action points should be compiled following formal debriefs.

There must be an audit process to ensure that issues identified during the debriefings are captured and embedded into future response plans and procedures.

Significant findings from this process should be recorded and an action log of issues to be addressed should be formulated. Typically this document would contain outstanding issues, individual/organisation responsible for completion of work and also agreed timescales.

It must also be recognised that the subject matter of debriefings may be disclosed in any subsequent civil or criminal proceedings.
Section 5 - Scene Management

Forward Command Post (FCP)

This will be established by the emergency services during the initial response, in order that activities can be properly coordinated. Should cordons be in place, it is likely that the FCP would be situated just outside the inner cordon; this is where the Operational Commanders at the scene will liaise and agree priorities.

Cordons

a. Generally

Any unauthorised access to the site of an emergency could hamper operations. Therefore cordons will be set up for the following reasons:

- To guard the scene
- To protect the public
- To control sightseers
- To prevent unauthorised interference with the scene
- To facilitate the work of the emergency services and other agencies

Precise cordon distances will depend upon the nature of the emergency.

b. Inner Cordon

An inner cordon should be established to enclose the scene of the emergency and contain any area of hazard or contamination. It will provide a measure of protection for personnel working within the area and preservation of a potential crime scene. Demarcation and control is a matter for the scene managers of relevant agencies based on the specific hazards.

Generally there should only be one entry and exit point to the inner cordon. Management of this will ensure that responding personnel can be safely accounted for should there be any escalation of the emergency. This also affords an opportunity for briefing attendees with regard to the evacuation signal, health and safety considerations, hazards, control measures and other issues that they need to be aware of.
Generally the Police have the responsibility, when appropriate, to ensure that details of persons entering or leaving the inner cordon are documented for evidential purposes.

Individual agencies remain responsible for the health and safety of their personnel that they may have operating within the inner cordon. However, in the absence of appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE), scene managers should consider refusal into the risk area.

c. **Outer Cordon**

This will be set up by the Police in order to seal off an extensive area around the inner cordon and provide a controlled area into which only authorised personnel have access. The command and control vehicles of the responders and other essential on scene functions will normally be positioned within the outer cordon.

d. **Scene Access Control Point**

Control of access arrangements via designated scene access control points will be imposed for both the inner and outer cordon. These points should be established early in the response, to ensure that any non-emergency services personnel who have a justifiable reason for being within either cordon are allowed access.

e. **Traffic Cordon**

This will be set up to prevent congestion at the scene and allow the free access and egress of emergency services and other responders. Personnel staffing the cordons should implement mechanisms for allowing non-emergency services personnel to gain access to the scene.

**CBRNE Cordons**

For further guidance regarding CBRNE procedures and protocols, refer to the NRF CBRNE plan.
Rendezvous Point (RVP)

As soon as practicable all resources proceeding to the scene should be directed to a designated Rendezvous Point. Its functions are:
- To maintain a log of incoming / outgoing resources
- Brief and debrief personnel
- Issue equipment as necessary

Marshalling Area

A marshalling area may be set up for resources not immediately required at the scene or which, having served their purpose, are being held for future use. This area is usually set up between the RVP and scene, within the outer cordon.

This area can also be used to provide briefing / debriefing facilities and welfare areas for staff that have been working at the scene.

Incident Control Point (ICP)

In a rapid onset emergency where there is an identifiable scene, then Tactical coordination will usually be carried out from an Incident Control Point located nearby, or directly adjacent to the scene. A TCG may, as a response progresses or circumstances dictate, be relocated to a point further removed from the emergency site.

There are a number of key requirements for the ICP these are:
- A safe location
- Accessible
- Secure
- Conspicuous
- Availability of communications

In addition the ICP should be sufficiently far away from the scene to prevent Commanders from being directly involved in Operational activities.
Some agencies may prefer to exercise command of their resources away from the ICP, but will send personnel to assist coordination.

Other on scene functions
Responders, particularly Silver Commanders, must consider the need to establish some, or all of the following functions within the outer cordon:

- Internal traffic routes
- Casualty clearing station
- Ambulance loading point
- Survivor assembly point
- Vehicle marshalling area
- Helicopter landing site
- Victim audit area (body holding)
- Triage
- Media liaison point

The JESIP protocol recommends that consideration is given to the multi-agency aspect during this decision making process.

Responder withdrawal
The decision regarding when to withdraw responders from a risk area can be a difficult one. But there is clearly a need for a robust risk based decision making process, in order to prevent individuals being exposed to an unacceptable level of risk.

In addition, the level and speed of response and withdrawal of responders, is likely to be subject to a certain degree of scrutiny - from those affected and also the media. A systematic multi-agency risk assessment process followed during pre-event, response and recovery stages, would provide a robust evidence base from which critical observations, should they arise, be countered.
Sudden Impact Incidents:
In the circumstances of a ‘sudden impact’ type event, such as a fire or explosion, decision making will be based primarily on the outcomes from the on-scene dynamic risk assessment process.

Slow Onset Incidents:
In the case of a ‘slow onset’ type emergency, such as a coastal inundation event, the following approaches should be considered:

1. The setting of an agreed definitive time by which all responders should be withdrawn to an area(s) of comparative safety - for example 3 hours prior to predicted high tide time

2. An approach based solely upon dynamic risk assessment at Operational and Tactical command levels

3. A combination of approaches (1) and (2), for example, the withdrawal of certain agencies by a pre-determined time, supported by retention of suitably equipped and trained responders, remaining within the risk area and working within a dynamic risk assessment regime.

Off scene functions
There are a number of facilities and procedures that may need to be activated away from the immediate scene of the emergency in order to support the response, these could include:

- Local Authority Emergency Centre
- Rest centres
- Family and friends reception centres
- Survivor reception centres
- Casualty bureau
- Resilience mortuary
- Receiving hospital procedures
- Media centre
- Humanitarian assistance centres
Flying Restrictions

If required, the Police (as ‘Emergency Coordinating Authority - ECA’) can request that a “Temporary Danger Area” is imposed around the scene. This will advise all aircraft pilots to avoid flying in a defined area in order to protect the safety of those working at the scene.

Any request for such restrictions from personnel at the scene will be made through the Police Contact and Control Room who will contact the Distress and Diversion Cell at the London Air Traffic Control Centre.

The Maritime & Coastguard Agency is also able to assume the ECA role in certain cases.

Suggested Scene Management Layouts

Inner Cordon
Outer Cordon

Incident Control Points (ICPs) for Tactical control and coordination

Other functions within outer cordon
- Survivor Assembly Point
- Casualty Clearing Station
- Ambulance Loading Point
- Victim Audit Area (Body Holding)
- Vehicle Marshalling Area
- Media Liaison Point
- Triage

Outer Cordon

Police
Fire
Ambulance
Others
L. A.

Inner Cordon

FCP
Section 6 - Meeting the Needs of Those Affected

General
The response to an emergency must consider the welfare, care and management of anyone who may be affected. This encompasses a number of groups:

- The injured
- Uninjured survivors and those without serious injuries
- Families and friends of survivors
- Those involved in the emergency but who are not physically injured e.g. evacuees, witnesses
- Specific groups such as children, the elderly and faith groups
- Family and friends of the deceased
- Rescue and response personnel

The Injured
The Ambulance Service will ensure casualties are prioritised in terms of treatment and transport using defined parameters. This may involve establishing a casualty clearing structure or area which will be staffed by Ambulance and medical staff.

The Ambulance Service is responsible for providing the Police with definitive casualty numbers and providing details of which casualty has been conveyed to which hospital. Where possible family groups will be kept together but this will depend on the clinical needs of each casualty.

Casualties with minor injuries that can be dealt with on scene will be managed by Ambulance and/or medical staff under the direction of the senior clinician on scene (usually the Medical Advisor or Forward Medical Advisor – Doctor) these casualties may be transported to the Survivor Reception Centre for further documentation to be completed.
Fatalities

Full details of the arrangements for dealing with fatalities are contained in the NRF Resilience Mortuary Plan. The following sections provide an overview of the process.

a. HM Coroner

HM Coroner has the ultimate responsibility for establishing the identity of the deceased together with the cause and time of death. Amongst other duties this involves authority for removal of deceased persons' bodies from the scene, recommendation to open a Temporary Mortuary, appointment of key roles, setting identification criteria, chairing the Identification Commission and authorising the release of deceased persons' bodies to the lawfully entitled person.

HM Coroner must be engaged as soon as possible in an emergency that has led to fatalities.

b. Victim Audit Area

This is a secure, private location where deceased persons' bodies and human remains that have been recovered from the scene can be held temporarily prior to transfer to a Mortuary. It should be close to the scene in a covered structure (an “air shelter” or similar demountable unit would be suitable). Police will maintain written records of all activity at the Victim Audit Area to ensure continuity of evidence.

c. Victim Recovery

The deceased and human remains will be recovered by specialist-trained Police Officers (Disaster Victim Identification – DVI officers) that will be appointed by the Senior Identification Manager. These officers will use Interpol or ACPO approved documentation appropriate to the circumstances. In addition the NFRS Underwater Search and Recovery Unit can provide body recovery services.

d. Senior Identification Manager (SIM)

The Police will appoint a Senior Identification Manager to lead arrangements regarding the identification of the deceased.
e. Property

Police DVI officers will not recover any property that is not with a deceased person’s body. However, all property could be used for evidential or victim identification purposes and must therefore be recovered in a manner which ensures integrity of evidence. Police Crime Scene Investigators will arrange this, possibly in coordination with Police Search Advisors (POLSA) and search teams.

Where there is a multi-agency investigation, for example when the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) are involved, procedures will be agreed with all agencies in order to ensure a systematic approach.

f. Family Liaison

The effective deployment of Police Family Liaison Officers (FLO’s) is crucial.

The Family Liaison Officer (FLO) is an investigative role and assists in the identification process by collecting ante mortem data from family and others.

They are also crucial in ensuring that families of the victims are given an appropriate level of liaison and are kept informed throughout the investigation and identification process.

Whilst they deal with the bereaved in a compassionate and caring manner they are not deployed to provide emotional and other support.

g. Resilience Mortuary

If the number of deceased exceeds or is likely to exceed existing Mortuary capacities, or to aid investigation, it may be necessary to open a Resilience Mortuary. This will be a decision for HM Coroner, following consultation with the Police, Pathologist.

h. Casualty Bureau

The Casualty Bureau provides a means of searching and creating records for missing persons, casualties, evacuees and survivors and the identification of potential matches, enabling the notification of concerned members of the public as to the location or situation concerning their family or friends.
The Casualty Bureau is the responsibility of the Police.

National plans are in place to facilitate mutual aid should it be required.

The decision to activate is taken by the Police Gold Commander.

Faith and Diversity Needs
An emergency could involve people from differing faith, cultural and religious backgrounds. All responding agencies must ensure that consideration is given to the specific associated needs during these traumatic events.

Requirements may relate to medical treatment, gender issues, hygiene, diet, clothing, accommodation and place for prayer.

Every care should be taken to cater for those needs. It is important to engage appropriate faith, religious and ethnic community leaders at an early stage. Contact with the Norfolk and Waveney Churches Together Ecumenical Major Incident Team should be made via the Voluntary & Faith Coordinating Cell.

Where there are fatalities, responders should also be aware of customs in respect of dealing with the deceased. Hospital Chaplains are conversant with these customs and could be asked to assist.

Family and Friends Reception Centres
Previous emergencies have shown that people will travel to the scene or other focal points, if they believe that their family or friends may have been involved. The local authorities will lead in identifying and establish the Family and Friends Reception Centres at suitable locations, in consultation with the Police and Voluntary & Faith Sector. Where necessary, faith organisations should be present.

These centres will assist in the process of reuniting family and friends with survivors and provide the capacity to register, interview and provide shelter.

They can be near the scene, in the area of the community affected or at arrival and departure points.
Accurate and timely information is vital and a method for collection and distribution at the centres must be set up.

**Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HAC)**

In the aftermath of an emergency, the immediate humanitarian concerns will be dealt with by the establishment of Rest Centres, Family and Friends Reception Centres and associated facilities.

However it is important to consider the humanitarian requirements over a longer period. If it is decided that there is a need to provide a wider range of practical and emotional support services than Reception Centres can offer, the SCG can authorise the activation of a Humanitarian Assistance Centre (HAC).

The composition and location of the HAC will be emergency specific.

Key functions of the HAC can be summarised as:

- A focal point for information and assistance to families and friends of those missing, injured or killed, survivors, and to all those directly affected by, and involved in, the emergency
- Enable those affected to benefit from appropriate information and assistance in a timely, coordinated manner
- Where necessary, facilitate the gathering of forensic samples in a timely manner, to assist the identification process
- Offer access to, and guidance on a range of agencies and services, allowing people to make informed choices according to their needs
- Ensure a seamless multi-agency approach to humanitarian assistance in emergencies that should minimise duplication and avoid gaps

Full details of this process in Norfolk are contained in the NRF Humanitarian Assistance Plan.

**Vulnerable Persons**

A key element of the response is the early identification of vulnerable people or premises.

This information is often contained in the following resources:

- Category 1 and 2 responders’ plans
- Community NHS Trusts
- Community Emergency Plans supported by local knowledge
- Norfolk County Council has a mapping browser system which could provide information relating to care homes within the county
- Norfolk County Council - Safeguarding Teams, Adult Social Services, Children’s Services
- Care Quality commission Website

Rest Centres
See Section 7 for further guidance regarding Rest Centres.
Section 7 – Evacuation

Purpose

The purpose of evacuation is to move people and (where appropriate) other living creatures away from an actual or potential danger to a place that is safer for them.

It is very important to recognise that an evacuation should only take place if the benefit of leaving an area significantly outweighs the risk of sheltering in place. Evacuation should not be assumed to be the best option for all risks and it may not be the safest.

This document does not provide specific details for all risks and eventualities; it provides guidance that is scalable in order to manage a range of risks.

A checklist for use by staff engaged in the evacuation process is attached at Appendix H.

Stages

An evacuation will follow a five stage process:

1. Evacuation Decision
2. Warning and Informing
3. Evacuation
4. Shelter
5. Return and Recovery
The following chart illustrates this process:

1. Possible Evacuation Areas
2. Event alert or trigger
3. Identify likely evacuation area(s)
4. Evacuation Decision
5. Warning & Informing
6. Evacuation
7. Shelter in place
8. Shelter
9. Return & Recovery
10. Assistance
11. Dispersal

Public Awareness
Evacuation Command and Control

Given the large range of agencies that will be involved in managing an evacuation multi-agency coordination is essential. It is likely that the event will have triggered the activation of a command and control structure into which the evacuation element must be fully integrated (Section 4 refers).

Experience has identified that a decision to evacuate is best taken at the Tactical level. In addition the timing and location of an Evacuation Cell, tasked with managing all activities in relation to evacuation, should also be taken at a Tactical level.

Decision and Powers

The decision to evacuate will be determined by the nature of the emergency and risk timescale. It is not the responsibility of any one agency. The decision making process is usually coordinated by the Police in liaison with other emergency services and organisations.

There is no statutory power (except under certain circumstances covered by the Terrorism Act) to enforce an evacuation. However, a policy should be implemented for those instances where people refuse to evacuate.

The following flow chart has been prepared to help decision makers when dealing with an emergency where evacuation has to be considered.
Outline Evacuation / Invacuation Process

1. Consider options for evacuation
   - Some possible considerations:
     - Establish Evacuation Guidelines
     - Is it safer to remain inside?
     - Identification of vulnerable persons
     - Identify safe locations and routes
     - Availability of shelter and transport
     - Consider persons already outside e.g. on the streets and parks

2. Evacuate?
   - Go In, Stay In, Tune In Message
     - Is it safe to remain?
       - Yes
         - Provide transport to safe location
       - No
         - Inform public and check area

3. Warn & Inform Public
   - Some public will self-disperse to safe locations e.g. family & friends

4. Provide information and guidance
   - Safe to return?
     - Yes
       - Return
     - No
       - Inform public and check area

5. Return
   - Response End

*The 5 Stages of Evacuation

DECISION  WARNING  WITHDRAWAL  SHELTER  RETURN

OFFICIAL

NORFOLK RESILIENCE FORUM
preparing for emergencies
Timings
These will vary according to the event. In a no notice emergency the safest option may be to tell people to shelter in place. The reasons for this include:

- There is no time to undertake an evacuation before the hazard arrives
- Going outside would expose people to greater harm or dangerous conditions
- The immediate risk is unclear.

Buildings can provide significant protection against most risks, and the public may be safer seeking shelter in the nearest suitable building, rather than dispersing or evacuating immediately.

Once the risk is understood, a decision needs to be made about how long the population should remain indoors and whether an evacuation is necessary and could be conducted without exposing the population to increased risk.

Where immediate shelter is advised the "Go In, Stay In Tune In" message should be used. This is a widely used tool to ensure that people can take shelter from hazards and it is broadcast via all media channels. See Warning and Informing Section.

Where evacuation is a necessity and, particularly in respect of the threat of flooding, timescales must be set. These must allow for a timely evacuation to avoid it turning into a rescue situation. Ideally everyone should be out of the area at risk at least three hours before the hazard arrives, although local conditions must be taken into consideration.

Assumptions
Although each situation must be dealt with on its own circumstances, it has been identified that approximately 80% of the people asked to evacuate will comply. Of those people, 80% will be self-sufficient in terms of accommodation and transport leaving responders to assist the remainder.

Evacuation Zones
In those areas where it can be anticipated that evacuation is a possibility, for example areas at risk of flooding or around Control of Major Accident Hazard sites, it will be advantageous to carry out preliminary planning. Several emergency response plans have already been prepared, these identify specific zones and where applicable the location of vulnerable premises / infrastructure. This pre-planning allows all those involved in the response to have a shared understanding of the area at risk.
Transport

Notwithstanding that many people will be able to self-evacuate transport needs must be a major consideration.

It may be appropriate to set up a Transport Cell to deal with this issue. In an emergency involving a relatively small area this can work with the Evacuation Cell at the Tactical Coordinating Group; in a widespread emergency coordination will need to take place at County Level and form part of the Norfolk County Council responsibilities.

Transport provided by Norfolk County Council, for example school buses and social care vehicles will be used. Providers of these services must be fully integrated into the coordination process. Key issues that will need to be addressed are:

- Competing requests for resources
- Impacts on their normal activities of redeployed vehicles
- Ensuring that routes to be used are viable
- Request to other transport providers / taxi / private hire companies
- Driver hours
- Fuel availability

Consideration should also be given to the utilisation of the Voluntary Sector when assessing transport needs, for instance the provision of vehicles suitable for use off road, or on flood/snow/storm blocked roads. This capability would be accessed via the NRF Voluntary & Faith Capabilities Directory or the Voluntary & Faith Coordinating Cell.

Vulnerable People

The needs of vulnerable people must be addressed during the planning stages of any evacuation. There is significant guidance on identifying these people. There are easily identifiable establishments such as care and rest homes, hospitals and schools. However there are likely to be people living in the community that are vulnerable for example the elderly, frail and people with temporary medical conditions.

It is accepted that there is not a single data source of vulnerable people, therefore a range of sources must be considered to create what is termed a "list of lists". These include:
• Category 1 and 2 responders’ plans
• Community NHS Trusts
• NHS Primary & Community Care Providers
• Community Emergency Plans supported by local knowledge
• Norfolk County Council has access to information relating to care and residential homes
• Norfolk County Council Community Services, Children’s Services Teams and Adult Social Service Teams
• Care Quality Commission Website

Organisations should be aware of data sharing protocols when compiling this information.

Where local responders identify the location of vulnerable people their evacuation needs should be assessed and submitted to the Evacuation Cell without delay.

The extra requirements will not only extend to the evacuation stage, these must be a factor within the shelter provision that is made.

Care Homes
All care homes should have their own Business Continuity plans to manage an evacuation. In a wide area evacuation these homes will need to be incorporated into the overall coordination process as there is likely to be a requirement for specialist assets.

Shelter and Rest Centres
Shelter includes buildings, humanitarian assistance and support for individuals. It may be required for a few hours, through to several weeks. It is unlikely that the whole population will require shelter, those that are able and willing to make their own provision should be encouraged to do so. For others accommodation in the form of Rest Centres will be provided.

The responsibility for organising, staffing and providing logistical support for these Rest Centres (and Survivor Reception Centres) rests with the relevant Borough / City / District Council. However, they are dependant also on support from other organisations, such as the Voluntary and Faith Sector and the NHS.
Within Norfolk a number of locations have been identified as potential Rest Centres. These satisfy the required criteria and detailed plans for each location have been prepared. It is important therefore that the appropriate Borough / City / District Council is fully engaged the response at an early stage.

People that are being evacuated should be advised on timings, where to go, what transport arrangements there are and what to take with them. This information is contained in Community Emergency Plans and leaflets available on the Norfolk Prepared website: www.norfolkprepared.gov.uk

The long term housing needs of those made homeless by an emergency, or those who need to be evacuated for long periods of time, is also the responsibility of the Borough / City / District Council.

Warning & Informing

A key decision in the evacuation process is the method for delivery of messages. The media will be an integral element and should be engaged as soon as possible. The BBC “Connecting in a Crisis” protocol is a useful arrangement for the timely delivery of messages.

In some cases the most effective means of warning and informing will be by way of calling at all premises in the area at risk. This is highly labour intensive and effective coordination is essential.

If a media cell has been set up as part of the overall response this must work closely with the Evacuation Cell to ensure accurate and timely information is given out. The Norfolk Resilience Forum Emergency Media Plan contains full details.

Areas around COMAH sites, known as Public Information Zones, have been pre-identified. Methods of warning the public within these locations are detailed within the Off-site plans which have been established for “top tier” COMAH sites.

Security

People will need to be reassured that if they do evacuate their property will be safeguarded (if possible). Demands on the police service will be high and there may be limited resources available to protect vacated areas. If time permits the following measures can be taken:
Implement a multi-agency crime prevention strategy (local community safety partnerships could be involved in this)
Communication to reassure homeowners and deter potential lawbreakers, including during the return and recovery stages. If people are told that their homes are secure, responders must be confident that this is actually the case;
Highly visible police enforcement strategies
A review of the ability of private security companies to provide a security presence within their normal remit, as they do at buildings and sites, or at large events
Information should be issued on how to secure an evacuated home and how to indicate to the emergency services that a building has been completely vacated.

Animals
Pet’s Public information should include clear advice regarding the agreed Policy on the evacuation of pets.

Farmed – it’s likely that evacuation areas, particularly in a flooding incident may include farmed animals. This significant issue should receive careful consideration particularly as many farmed animals are situated miles away from their owners/keepers premises.

Reoccupation
Throughout the evacuation process, consideration should be given to the return of people to their homes and of businesses to their commercial properties. Existing emergency arrangements are such that an officer from the Local Authority will be appointed to consider recovery issues from the outset. A key theme of recovery is this return of evacuated people, however it will need to be carefully managed.

The decision to return should be made by the Tactical Coordinating Group. Issues to be considered are:-
• Is it safe to return?
• Should a phased return be implemented so that key workers across essential services and those who will be instrumental in the recovery process can return first?
• Needs of vulnerable people
- People are likely to want to return to their homes and businesses as soon as they can;
- People can probably not be prevented from returning unless a specific risk remains in certain areas of the evacuation zone
- The safe reinstatement of utilities
- Support Services
- Reopening of public facilities / schools
Section 8 – Resilient Communications

Norfolk Resilient Telecommunications Plan

The NRF Critical Infrastructure Group is responsible for maintaining a plan of communication links across the responding agencies within the County.

This group has access to technical information from a variety of sources and should be consulted should a communications difficulty be envisaged or arise.

The Norfolk Resilient Telecommunications Plan will provide information regarding the options for resilient communications in the event of an emergency.

Airwave

Police, Fire and Rescue Service, Ambulance Service and LA Emergency Planning Teams in Norfolk all utilise Airwave, a digital communications system. Whilst they all have the same system, the NRF Airwave Interoperability Standard Operating Procedures (located within the Norfolk Resilience Telecommunications Plan) have been developed to ensure continuity of operations.

If necessary, Norfolk Constabulary can deploy a number of Airwave terminals for use by other responders.

British Telecom

British Telecom (BT) can provide a wide range of telecommunication service support during the response to an emergency.

On request a BT Local Liaison Manager (LLM) will attend at the SCG, TCG or other emergency response meeting. The initial point of contact will be via the BT National Emergency Linkline.

Mobile Telecommunications Privileged Access Scheme (MTPAS)

In the aftermath of an emergency the mobile networks can become overwhelmed with a high concentration of calls. To ensure that responding agencies are able to maintain access to these networks, the MTPAS has been designed.
To invoke MTPAS, and following an agreed protocol, the Police Gold Commander advises all network operators that a major emergency has been declared. This notification will prompt the invocation of MTPAS. Handsets installed with the special SIM card will have a much higher likelihood of being able to connect to their network and make calls than other customers.

Police Gold Commanders must be aware that a decision to invoke MTPAS may have unforeseen consequences by inhibiting data links for Category 1 Responders. Therefore careful consideration and consultation must be made before taking this action, and the invocation of MTPAS is not viewed as a matter of course for all emergencies.
Section 9 - Working with the Media

Norfolk Emergency Media Plan

This plan has been produced by the NRF Warning and Informing working group, with the active participation of local media organisations. It provides comprehensive guidance on how agencies will deal with all elements of the media response. Early activation of this plan is essential.

Warning and Informing the Public

One of the early considerations in any emergency is the need to identify the extent of the information that needs to be given to the public. This may include messages to evacuate or take shelter (“go in, stay in, tune in”).

The media are an ideal conduit to get these messages to a wide audience using local radio and TV stations.

Media Briefing Point

Operational Commanders must be aware that the media will seek access at or near the scene. Therefore a suitable location (a media briefing point) should be identified in order for them, for example, to obtain pictures without interfering with the work being carried out, at the scene or rest centres.

Initial Holding Statement

During any emergency the media pressure for information will be immediate and sustained. It is essential that press officers from the responding agencies liaise and consult effectively with each other, whilst dealing with the needs of their individual organisations.

There will be considerable pressure to produce a Holding Statement at an early stage; therefore the coordinating agency will produce one that is agreed by all responders.

Sample holding statements are provided within the Norfolk Resilience Forum Emergency Media Plan.
Media Centre
If the emergency is on a large scale and is likely to attract media attention for a protracted period, consideration will be given to setting up a Media Centre. This will provide journalists with a base from which to operate, shelter and access welfare facilities. The benefits of this are improved communications and rapid organisation of press briefings and interviews.

Telephone Helpline
Depending on the nature of the emergency and likely public demand an early decision to set up a call centre must be made.

A set of frequently asked questions specific to the event for use by call centre operators must be drawn up, together with a briefing, the Media Cell will be responsible for this.

Protocol will need to be agreed if the Police Casualty Bureau is also activated.

Connecting in a Crisis
‘Connecting in a Crisis’ is a BBC initiative that seeks to help meet the public demand for information in the event of an emergency. It is about warning and informing in the interests of public safety and concentrating on delivering essential information quickly.

Preparatory work undertaken ensures there are close links between responders and BBC local broadcasters on both radio and television, so that in the event of an emergency, there is a means to provide essential information, warnings, advice and reassurance in the first few hours.
Section 10 - Investigation

Overview
All emergencies and major emergencies have the potential to be a crime scene, it is likely that there will be an investigation, whether it is for an HM Coroner inquest, criminal or civil proceedings, public inquiries or internal investigations.

The Police will normally appoint a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) to oversee all aspects of the investigation, including liaison with other statutory bodies as necessary.

Evidence Gathering
This will start with protection of the scene and other locations as appropriate by implementing robust cordons with clearly designated and controlled scene access control points.
All agencies are aware of the need to preserve evidence providing this does not inhibit rescue operations.

Log Keeping
A comprehensive record should be kept of all events, decisions, rationale for decisions and action taken.
All agencies will use their own log sheets / records for this purpose. These should be retained for use in any subsequent proceedings as above.
If no formal enquiry takes place, the keeping and retention of this evidence will assist in the debriefing process.

Statutory Bodies
In addition to the Police, a number of other agencies will have a statutory duty to investigate an emergency depending on the circumstances.

These could include:
- Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratory Agency (AHVLA)
- Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB)
• Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)
• Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB)
• Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
• Fire and Rescue Service (FRS)
• Environment Agency (EA)
• Local Authority (LA)

If they require access to the scene, this must be formally facilitated through the command structure in place.
Section 11 - Staff Welfare

Overview
Emergencies will put enormous demands on all those involved in the response and recovery. Agencies must therefore ensure they look after the physical and psychological welfare of staff. Consideration of the Voluntary & Faith Group Sector should be utilised with regard to these issues.

Physical Requirements
To ensure responders remain effective the following are key provisions that must be in place:
- Reasonable shift lengths
- Shift rotas
- Refreshments at all locations, to provide warmth or prevent dehydration
- Facilities for taking meals away from the scene
- Washing and changing facilities
- Medical and first aid facilities

Psychological Requirements
In addition to the physical needs, meeting the psychological requirements of staff is vital. They include:
- Proper briefings
- Honest information about what to expect
- A quiet space to unwind and think
- An opportunity to discuss experiences with someone
- Access to information on sources of help
- Information on what constitutes a “normal reaction”
- Where necessary support for responder’s families
- Debriefing at the end of a day’s activity
- Access to skilled professional help
- Provision of Occupational Health Services
Section 12 - Recovery

Definition

Recovery is defined as:

“The process of rebuilding, restoring and rehabilitating the community following an emergency, but it is more than simply the replacement of what has been destroyed and rehabilitation of those affected”.

“It relates to those activities focused on returning a community to a “new normality” after an emergency. It will be assisted if the affected community are involved in the managing of their own recovery”.

(Emergency Response and Recovery Guidance, HM Government)

Transfer Lead Agency Responsibility

The criteria for assessing when the handover can take place from response to recovery should be agreed by the chair of the SCG and the chair of the RCG.

Within Norfolk it is accepted that if only one District Council is involved in an emergency, the Chief Executive of that District will usually have the responsibility for the response and recovery efforts. It follows therefore that a District or County Council Managing Director (or their nominee) can activate recovery arrangements in Norfolk.

In some cases a gradual hand-over of responsibility from response to recovery may be more effective, e.g. if a number of sites are involved.

See Appendix I for a Handover Certificate template.

Note: The NRF document “Norfolk Recovery Guidance” provides further information regarding recovery processes and protocols.
Appendix A – Norfolk Resilience Forum

Section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 and Regulation 4(1) of the Regulations requires “Category 1” and “Category 2" responders in a local resilience area to co-operate with each other in connection with the performance of duties under the legislation. The statutory Local Resilience Forum has been established in Norfolk and is known as the “Norfolk Resilience Forum” (NRF).

The NRF is the collective name for all groups within the framework. Membership involves organisations identified as Category 1 and Category 2 organisations within the legislation, plus many other agencies. All organisations represented within the NRF make valuable contributions to the wider community resilience planning activity in Norfolk, before, during and after an emergency.

**Category 1 Responders – Civil Contingencies Act 2004**

Borough Council of King’s Lynn & West Norfolk
Breckland Council
British Transport Police
Broadland District Council
Clinical Commission Groups
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Environment Agency
Great Yarmouth Borough Council
James Paget Hospital NHS Trust
Maritime and Coastguard Agency
NHS England East Anglia Area Team
Norfolk & Norwich University Hospital NHS Trust
Norfolk Constabulary
Norfolk County Council
Norfolk Fire & Rescue Service
Norfolk & Suffolk Foundation Trust
North Norfolk District Council
Norwich City Council
National Commissioning Board Local Area Team
Public Health England
Queen Elizabeth Hospital Kings Lynn NHS Trust
South Norfolk Council

*Category 2 Responders – Civil Contingencies Act 2004*

Abellio Greater Anglia
Anglian Water Services Ltd
BT Worldwide Networks
Department of Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
Essex and Suffolk Water
East Midlands Trains
Great Yarmouth Port Authority
Health & Safety Executive
Highways Agency (Amey and Mouchel)
National Grid Transco
Network Rail (Anglian Region)
NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups
Norwich International Airport
NHS Clinical Commissioning Groups
North Norfolk Council
UK Power Networks
Wells Harbour Commissioners

In addition, the following organisations are represented:

**Armed Forces**

Military HQ 49 (East) Brigade
Royal Air Force
Radio & Media
Anglia Television
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC)
Eastern Daily Press
Evening News
Heart 102.4FM
KLFM

Voluntary & Faith Group Sector
4x4 Response
British Red Cross
Cruse Bereavement Care
Kings Lynn & West Norfolk Emergency Volunteers
Norfolk Civil Protection Volunteers
Norfolk Lowland Search and Rescue
Norfolk RAYNET
North Anglia RAYNET
Norfolk & Waveney Churches Together Ecumenical Major Incident Team
Rover Rescue
RSPCA
Salvation Army
Samaritans
St John Ambulance
Skywatch (No 3 Norfolk Civil Air Patrol Units)
Voluntary Norfolk
Victim Support
WRVS
Other
Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratory Agency
Broads Authority
Department for Communities & Local Government - Resilience and Emergencies Division
Central Natural England
First Eastern Counties Buses
King’s Lynn Conservancy Board
National Farmers Union
Norfolk Association of Local Councils
Norfolk Community Health & Care NHS Trust
Norfolk Wildlife Trust
Met Office
The National Trust
Water Management Alliance of Internal Drainage Boards
Appendix B – Agency Responsibilities

Animal Health & Veterinary Laboratory Agency (AHVLA)
In response to an outbreak of exotic notifiable disease AHVLA will implement disease control policies to support the Lead Government Department, Defra by
- Preventing the spread and eradicating the disease, to regain disease-free status
- Taking action on the Infected Premises
- Restricting animal and animal product movement controls
- Restricting leisure activities to reduce the risk of spread of disease
- Investigating the origin of disease
- Carrying out surveillance to investigate the spread of disease

Broads Authority
- Provide a range of waterborne craft, trained staff and 4x4 vehicles
- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate
- Conserve and enhance the natural beauty, wildlife and cultural heritage of the Norfolk Broads
- Protect the interests of navigation

DCLG – Departments for Communities and Local Government – Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED)
- Norfolk is covered by the Central Resilience and Emergencies Division (RED), which is based in Birmingham. In times of non-emergency the RED is responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness across the central region.
- In response to an emergency, the initial action of the RED is to establish communication with the SCG and to deploy a Government Liaison Officer (GLO).
- During an emergency the DCLG Co-ordinating Group and Operations Centre will be formed in the most serious circumstances. It does not become involved in local command and control arrangements unless empowered to by Emergency Regulations.
The precise role of the DCLG Co-ordinating Group and Operations Centre will vary depending on the scale and nature of the emergency. Generic aspects will involve:

- Advising on regional priorities and guiding the deployment of scarce resources
- Facilitating mutual aid arrangements, where appropriate
- Providing early warning of emerging major challenges and how they might best be addressed
- Ensuring an effective flow of communication between local and national levels, including reports to the national level on the response and recovery effort
- Ensuring that the national input to response and recovery is coordinated with the local efforts
- Collate and maintain a Strategic picture of the situation with a focus on consequence management and recovery
- Raising to a national level any issues than cannot be resolved at a local level

East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust

- To save life together with the other emergency services
- To provide treatment, stabilisation and care of those injured at the scene
- To provide a trained and experienced Medical Advisor and Forward Medical Advisor (Doctor) to advise the Ambulance Incident Commander and Operational (Bronze) Commander where required. The Medical Advisor will assist in the casualty clearing station and liaise with specialist receiving units such as Major Trauma Units.
- To provide appropriate transport, health care professionals, equipment and resources as appropriate
- To consider mobilisation of specialist assets such as the Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) and Mass Casualty Vehicles(s)
- To establish an effective triage sieve and triage sort system to determine the priority evacuation needs of those injured and to establish a safe location for casualty holding and casualty clearing areas
- To provide a command and control structure at the emergency for all National Health Service (NHS) and other medical resources
- To provide communication facilities for NHS resources at the scene, with direct radio links to hospitals via EEAST Hospital Liaison Officers.
- To nominate and alert the receiving hospitals from the official list of hospitals to receive those injured and inform the other agencies as appropriate
• To provide transport to the emergency scene for the Medical Incident Officer (MIO), MERIT and their equipment
• To arrange the most appropriate means of transport for those injured to the receiving and specialist hospitals, utilising air assets where appropriate
• To maintain emergency cover throughout the East of England area and return to a state of normality at the earliest time
• To act as a portal into the wider health services including the Public Health England Emergency Planning Advisors, and in the event of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear emergency liaise with the Health Protection Agency on the convening of the Science and Technical Advice Cell (STAC)
• Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate

Environment Agency
• Primary responsibilities for environmental protection of water (including ground water, estuaries and coastal waters), land and air
• Key responsibility for maintaining and operating flood defences on certain specified rivers and coastlines
• To provide remedial action to prevent and mitigate the environmental effects of the emergency
• To provide specialist advice on waste management, environmental pollution and hazardous sites
• To provide warnings of flooding via the Floodline Warnings Direct system to professional partners, media, business and the community
• To monitor the environmental effects of an emergency and to investigate its cause
• To collect evidence for future enforcement or cost recovery
• Participate in multi-organisational management teams for major events affecting our interest areas
• Establishment of an Air Quality Cell, if requested, to coordinate air monitoring during non CBRNE emergencies

Health and Safety Executive
• Category 2 responder
• Provide information to Category 1 and 2 responders
• Cooperate with Category 1 and 2 responders
• Investigate major emergencies at the termination of the emergency
• Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate
Lead Government Department

Where the scale or complexity of an emergency is such that some degree of central government coordination or support becomes necessary, a designated Lead Government Department (LGD) will be made responsible for the overall management of the Government response.

Amongst the responsibilities of the LGD are:-

- Produce a brief, accurate situation report on the nature and scale of the emergency and submit this promptly along with the central briefing for media purposes to their Minister
- Draw upon and apply the relevant capabilities applicable to the emergency in hand and if required, coordinate the support needed from other Government Departments and agencies through the Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR)
- Use its authority decisively to take whatever executive decisions and actions are needed from the centre to handle the emergency or to help local responders to deal with it
- Where the LGD need scientific and technical advice they will activate a Science Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).

Public Health England

Public Health England is be responsible for providing public health Emergency Preparedness Resilience and Response leadership and scientific and technical advice at all organisational levels, working in partnership with other organisations to protect the public.

- Provide national leadership and coordination for the public health elements of the emergency preparedness, resilience and response system.
- Provide health protection services, expertise and advice and co-ordinate the PHE response to major incidents
- Provide risk analysis and assessment of emerging diseases, natural extreme events, chemical, radiological and Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE) threats to inform the Department of Health and other government departments and agencies, health and multi-agency EPRR
- Ensure provision of high quality and timely public health data to the Secretary of State, NHS England and providers, local authorities and across Government, in preparedness and response
- Provide guidance to professionals in health and local government and other sectors
Communicate with the public by providing information and advice relevant to PHE’s responsibilities.

**Highways Agency**

The Highways Agency Traffic Officer Service will:

- Provide ongoing support to traffic management, monitoring CCTV and emergency roadside phones and Tactical sign/signal setting, including public information through Variable Message Signs both static and mobile
- Provide emergency traffic management and maintain temporary or permanent road closures
- Through service providers and managing agents, repair and, where able, improve roads and infrastructure
- Clear vehicles and other debris from those roads and other places to which the Highways Agency has responsibility
- Keep arterial routes clear by providing high visibility patrols
- Manage the day to day operation of the Strategic transportation network (facilitated by the Eastern Region Control Centre) within the affected area
- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate

The Highways Agency will:

- Through service providers and managing agents provide ongoing support to traffic management including public information and signage
- Through service providers and managing agents provide and maintain temporary or permanent road closures
- Through service providers and managing agents repair and, where able, improve roads and infrastructure
- Clear debris from those roads (A11 & A47) and other places to which the Highways Agency has responsibility
- Support the management of the day to day operation of the motorway network (by the East Regional Control Centre and mobile patrols within the affected area, including minor improvements, congestion relief, encouragement of alternative travel modes and reviewing the adequacy of the current network and planning for the future
- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate
Local Authorities

Shared responsibilities:

- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate
- Provide support to the emergency services both during and in the immediate aftermath of an emergency
- Continue to provide support for the local and wider community through any disruptions

County:

- Coordinate a cross Local Authority border response
- Coordinate Recovery phase of emergency
- Participate in the management of disaster funds
- Trading Standards (animal disease control, food safety)
- Provide support to District/City/Borough councils
- Coordinate the establishment of a Resilience Mortuary, if required
- Elected Member liaison
- Provision of transport
- Public Health advice

City/Borough/District:

- If required identify and manage Humanitarian Assistance Centres, Survivor Reception Centres, Rest Centres, Family and Friends Reception Centres and Family Assistance Centres
- Liaise with Parish, Town Councils, Housing, Health businesses and the local community with regard to preparing for and mitigating the effect of an emergency
- As the emphasis moves from response to recovery, assume the coordinating role to facilitate the rehabilitation of the community and restoration of the environment. This aspect must commence as soon as the emergency occurs
- Use Local Authority resources to assist with the mitigation of the effects on people, property and infrastructure
- Arrange temporary accommodation for persons made homeless as a result of the emergency or major emergency
- Act or advise on any environmental matter resulting from the emergency (in conjunction with the Environment Agency)
- Provide advice on dangerous structures
Maritime Coastguard Agency
- Initiate and coordinate civilian maritime search and rescue
- Mobilising, organising and dispatching resources to assist persons in distress at sea, in danger on the cliffs or shoreline, or in danger in inland areas due to flooding
- Dealing with pollution at sea and in conjunction with local authorities for the shoreline clean up
- Coordination of search and rescue for emergencies on inland waterways
- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate

Meteorological Office (Met Office)
- Provide National Severe Weather Warning Service
- Provide regional email briefings from the Met Office Advisor (Civil Contingencies)

NHS England East Anglia Area Team/NHS Norfolk & Waveney CCG’s
- Lead and coordinate the NHS England Regional team response to an emergency
- Provide appropriate clinical settings for the treatment of people with minor injuries and conditions such as reception centres, minor injury centres, walk in centres, community hospitals and general practice
- Must have agreed systems in place to nominate a lead CCG to manage an incident at a local level
- Provide care and advice to evacuees, survivors and relatives, including replacement medication
- Assist acute trusts surge management procedures where appropriate through supported accelerated discharge arrangements.
- Coordinate community hospital bed capacity in liaison with local acute hospitals
- Assess the effects of an emergency on vulnerable care groups, such as children, dialysis patients, elderly, medically dependent, or physically or mentally disabled
- Establish facilities for mass distribution of countermeasures; for example, vaccinations and antibiotics, administration of medications, prophylactics, and vaccines
- Provide support, advice and leadership to the local community on health aspects of an emergency
- Support screening, epidemiology and long term assessment and management of the effects of an emergency
- Provide psychological and mental health support to staff, patients and relatives in conjunction with the appropriate provide;
- Continue to provide essential core business services
- Work with the Local Authority and community to support the Recovery Phase
- Assess the medium term impact on the community and priorities for the restoration of normality
- Consider the need for long term monitoring
- Must provide a chairperson for the STAC
- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate

**Norfolk Constabulary**

- In conjunction with other agencies the saving and protection of life
- To secure, protect and preserve the scene to safeguard evidence for subsequent enquiries or criminal proceedings
- In most instances, the coordination of the emergency services, local authorities and other organisations acting in support at the scene of the emergency
- In conjunction with other emergency services, control access to the emergency location through maintenance of cordons at appropriate distances (where cordons are relevant to the emergency)
- Coordinate land based search activities for survivors and casualties in the immediate vicinity of a disaster scene, where necessary using support from other emergency services, the armed Forces or volunteers
- Participate in coordinated media engagement where appropriate
- Process casualty information and take responsibility for identifying the arranging the removal of fatalities on behalf of HM Coroner
- The investigation of the emergency and obtaining and securing of evidence in conjunction with other investigative bodies where applicable (Health & Safety Executive, Air, Rail or Marine Accident Investigation Branches)
- Prevention of crime
- Assume overall control of terrorist related emergencies at the scene, including additional measures to restrict access or evacuate people
- Provide a Police input into the recovery process
Norfolk Fire and Rescue Service

- In conjunction with other agencies saving, protecting life and rendering humanitarian services
- Provision of fire fighting, fire Prevention advice and engagement, salvage and fire investigation
- Providing advice for safety management within the vicinity of a disaster
- Responding to collapsed structures to render humanitarian services
- Provision of water and underwater search, rescue and recovery
- Defection identification, monitoring and management of hazardous materials
- Protection of the environment

Voluntary & Faith Groups

There are numerous voluntary aid societies and faith groups that are able to contribute towards the successful outcome of the response to an emergency. Their support can alleviate some pressure on responders by providing a range of humanitarian and practical services.

It is important to note that some voluntary agencies such as the British Red Cross and the St John Ambulance may already be engaged in community activity which could impact on their availability.

The NRF has produced a Voluntary and Faith Capabilities Directory, which includes roles, contact details and response capability.

A memorandum of understanding has been written to record the principles of an arrangement between the NRF and the Voluntary and Faith Sector. In support of this arrangement, the roles of the NRF Voluntary and Faith Sector Coordinator and Support Officer have been written to ensure a robust and coordinated response to an emergency during all required phases.
Defence contributes to UK resilience through the provision of a number of guaranteed niche capabilities (such as Search and Rescue, and Explosive Ordnance Disposal) and a process of augmenting civil authorities and structures when civil capability or capacity is exceeded. When Defence augments civil capability, it will be in response to specific requests for a planned response or to a crisis. Defence augmentation is not guaranteed.

Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA) can be sought to support the civil authorities when they have an urgent need for help to deal with an emergency arising from a natural disaster or a major emergency. However, assistance is provided on an availability basis and the Armed Forces cannot make a commitment that guarantees assistance to meet specific emergencies. It is therefore essential that Category 1 and 2 responders do not base plans and organise exercises on the assumption of military assistance.

HQ 49 (East) Brigade, the Army Regional Brigade HQ for the East of England and East Midlands, will be able to give advice and should be contacted in the first instance.

Contact should be made through the Brigade's Joint Regional Liaison Officer (JRLO), who is the primary focus for the integration of military UK operations with civil authorities, and who is a member of the Norfolk Resilience Forum. The JRLO may act in a liaison capacity at local or sub-national civil emergency control centres when appropriate, providing a link to the MoD’s UK command structure. Liaison involves the provision of advice and exchange of information. It does not guarantee the provision of support.

Requests for military aid should focus on the capability required: the solution will be determined by ministerial approval, availability of military resources and the Commander's judgement. Experience indicates that the JRLO should be informed if the Strategic Coordinating Group (Gold Command) is activated. This will facilitate the military response if one is needed.

The provision of MACA is guided by 3 criteria:

- Military aid should only be provided where the need for someone to act is clear and where other options have been discounted by the Civil Responder. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.
The Civil Authority making the request lacks the required level of capability to fulfil the task and it is Resilience Direct reasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one

The Civil Authority has a capability but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources

When considering military assistance, it is important to bear in mind both the qualitative and the quantitative characteristics of the Armed Forces:

- The Armed Forces are relatively small when compared to the numbers of personnel in the emergency services, health service and local authorities
- The skills, the equipment, and the capabilities of the Armed Forces are designed for military use and focused on expeditionary operations
- The Armed Forces themselves draw on civil capabilities wherever necessary
- The Armed Forces are not designed to provide an emergency response service, with certain exceptions
- The Armed Forces do not have a monopoly on equipment suitable for use in emergencies

One particular ‘niche capability’ is of note. The Armed Forces, in conjunction with the Department for Transport (Maritime and Coastguard Agency) and Police, maintain a UK military/civilian Search and Rescue (SAR) capability to ensure the most effective and timely response is available to assist personnel in hazardous situations. This capability is established for military purposes but it is MOD policy to render assistance whenever possible to other persons, aircraft or vessels in distress. MOD-declared SAR resources consist of RN and RAF SAR helicopters and RAF Mountain Rescue Teams (MRT). These resources can be accessed directly through the Aeronautical Rescue Co-ordination Centre (ARCC) at Kinloss Barracks.

It is anticipated from 2015 the SAR function will be provided by Bristow Helicopters Ltd.

MACA activity is, with a few specific exceptions, not funded within the MOD vote and is conducted on a repayment basis – Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. MOD Ministers can decide to reduce or waive costs should they regard it as being in the national interest to do so. The decision on the level of cost recovery is made on a case-by-case basis. No costs are charged to the Civil Authority in situations where life is at risk or in exceptional other circumstances.
The booklet, "Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience" Joint Doctrine Publication 02 2nd Edition [2007] is a single source document providing guidance on MACA and other UK operations, an overview of Government policy, and the legal and constitutional basis for MACA provision. This booklet is unclassified and can be accessed on the UK Resilience website at:

http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/operations-uk-defence-contribution-resilience

Further information can be found in "Emergency Preparedness" Chapter 15 at:
and in “Emergency Response and Recovery” Chapter 3 at:
http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/Chapter%203.pdf
Appendix D – Specimen Tactical Considerations

Tactical Checklist

This guidance is not designed to be exhaustive, but provides an overview of key issues that the Tactical Commander will need to consider. It is based upon Police checklists, but can be used as a framework for multi-agency coordination.

Command, Control and Coordination

- Coordinate the response of the emergency services and support agencies
- Accept Tactical command of resources involved in the emergency
- Identify an appropriate command and control structure; is SCG likely to be required?
- The scale of the emergency will dictate the appropriate venue from where the emergency can be coordinated. This may be near to the scene or at another venue such as a Police Station. Key factors will be:
  - Incident scale
  - Need to avoid being drawn into Operational decision making process
  - Requirement to coordinate and maintain overview of the entire Tactical response
  - Requirement to take in information and intelligence from a wide range of sources
  - Need for effective liaison with SCG if established.
- If necessary appoint Operational staff to attend
- Make sure that other agencies are aware of the location of TCG and that personnel attending are authorised to make Tactical decisions on behalf of their organisation
- Do you need specialist advice i.e. Tactical Advisors, Health and Safety, Operational Planning Manage? This can be obtained through partner agencies who lead on such matters, and could involve setting up a small cell tasked with obtaining the relevant advice
- Ensure you have sufficient staff support, i.e. staff officer, loggist
- Record keeping is vital. Ensure that there is a comprehensive record of all actions, options considered, information available and rationale for decisions taken

In addition activities undertaken should meet the requirements of the JESIP protocol.
Safety Issues
- Review and update as necessary any risk assessments in accordance with JESIP (ongoing process);
- Technical assessment of hazards
- Personal protective equipment required
- Other countermeasures required?
- Make sure staff are fully aware of hazards
- Decontamination issues
- Appointment of officer to oversee all health and safety issues

Initial briefing
- Obtain briefings from lead agency and other agencies as appropriate
- Declare a major emergency if necessary
- Make sure that all appropriate initial actions have been taken

Working with the Media
- Identify appropriate initial media message
- Request attendance of press officer
- Identify media briefing point
- Consider access for camera crews (use pooling arrangements if necessary)
- Activation of Norfolk Emergency Media Plan

Casualty Clearance
- Set up a survivor rendezvous point as interim measure prior to setting up a Survivor Reception Centre
- Ensure staff are deployed to Casualty Clearing Station and Ambulance Loading Point
- These officers should identify access / egress routes to hospitals and maintain details of those persons removed by ambulance

Scene Access
- Road closure / control of access points
- Access routes for responders
- Diversions
- Rendezvous Points
- Marshalling Area

**Immediate Public information / protection**
- Obtain professional guidance on what information should be broadcast. In most cases this is likely to be “Go in, Stay in, Tune in”.

**Scene Security**
- To ensure scene security, access and control points;
- Set up:
  - Inner cordon
  - Outer cordon
  - If necessary traffic cordon
- Ascertain details of non-emergency services personnel that require access through the cordons

**Investigation**
Request as necessary:
- Crime Scene Investigators
- Senior Investigating Officer
- Senior Identification Manager – usually appointed by Police Gold Commander
- Identify other investigative agencies that may be involved i.e. Air Accident Investigations Branch, Health and Safety Executive and liaise as necessary

**Information Cell**
- Ensure there is an effective process to develop an accurate assessment of the situation by collecting, recording and evaluating available information
- Share information with other responders as necessary

**Evacuation**
- Consider evacuation, shelter and reoccupation (See also Appendix H)
Staff Welfare
• Rest/refreshments available (consult with logistics)
• Frequent briefings
• Deployment of occupational health and welfare officer
• Debriefing arrangements

Casualty Bureau
• Is Casualty Bureau required? Discuss with SIO/SIM if necessary

Receiving Hospitals
Ensure Operational teams are deployed to receiving hospitals. Their roles are:
• Casualty documentation (possibly in consultation with SIM team)
• Property
• Reception
• Public order

Logistics
• Staffing
• Specialist / technical equipment
• Specialist skills required
• Communications networks
• Transport
• Catering
• Mutual Aid
• Police National Mobilisation Plan

Community Impact Assessment
• Must be carried out and updated as necessary
Telecommunications
- Talk groups (see NRF Airwave Interoperability for Police, Fire & Amb SOP)
- Potential hazards of using communications equipment at the scene, are intrinsically safe radios required?
- Specialist / additional communications required
- Is Command Pod required?
- Should the MTPAS be activated?

Supporting Organisations (consider)
- Norfolk County Council Emergency Planning Duty Officer
- Voluntary & Faith Groups

Potential off Scene Functions
- Appoint Operational Commanders as required:
  - Family and Friends Reception Centre
  - Survivor Reception Centre
  - Rest Centres
  - Community Issues
  - Humanitarian Assistance Centre
  - Resilience Mortuary (likely to be a SIM decision)
Appendix E – Specimen SCG Agenda

1. Attendees (Confirm correct level of representation)
2. Apologies
3. Matters requiring urgent decisions/actions
4. Approval of previous minutes
5. Actions from previous meetings
6. Situation report
7. Update from agencies
8. Review of options
9. Establishment of support cells (refer to section 4)
10. Review of strategy
11. Communications Strategy, internal media and public information
12. Community Impact Assessment
13. Any other urgent business
14. Summary of actions allocated during this meeting
15. Time of next meeting/organisations required to attend
Appendix F – Specimen TCG Agenda

1. Attendees (Confirm of correct command level)
2. Apologies
3. Declaration of matters requiring urgent attention
4. Information and threat assessments (Sit Reps)
5. Media situation report
6. Review of joint situational awareness
7. Review of joint strategy
8. Powers and policy considerations
9. Tactical options
10. Review of key issues and actions
11. Time of next meeting
The role of the STAC is to ensure timely coordinated scientific, technical, environmental and public health advice to the SCG during the response to an emergency. It will:

- Provide a single point of scientific advice to the Gold Commander and other members of the SCG on the scientific, technical, environmental and public health consequences of the incident via a nominated STAC representative.
- Monitor and corral the responding science and technical community to deliver SCG high-level objectives.
- Agree any divergence from agreed arrangements for providing science and technical input.
- Pool available information and arrive, as far as possible, at a common view on the scientific and technical merits of different course of action.
- Provide a common brief to the technical lead from each agency represented in the cell on the extent of the evidence based available, and how the situation might develop, what this means, and the likely effects of various mitigation strategies.
- Agree with the SCG Chair on the advice to be given to the public on the health aspects of the incident and advice on actions to protect the public, including the consequences of any evacuation or containment policies.
- Provide clarification on advice provided to the SCG, to a single, nominated, point of contact with a multi-agency TCG.
- The provision of advice may continue into the recovery phase of an incident.
Appendix H – Evacuation Cell

Generally
Where the response to an emergency requires the evacuation of an area it may be appropriate for the Tactical Coordinating Group to set up an Evacuation Cell.

The cell should be made up of representatives from all appropriate agencies.

The cell will assume responsibility for the implementation of all aspects of the evacuation process.

Public safety is the main consideration when assessing the need to evacuate people.

Evacuation must not turn into a rescue situation.

Key Decision Making Elements

- Reason for evacuation
- Will bringing people outdoors put them at greater risk?
- Would shelter advice “Go in, Stay in, Tune in” be more appropriate?
- Size of area Population to be evacuated
- Special needs of elements of the population
- Time scale, where possible, an objective should be to have all persons evacuated from risk areas at least 3 hours ahead of the critical time
- Method of evacuation
- Transport available
- Public information / notification methods
- Key infrastructure issues such as loss of services and tactics to protect essential services
- Policy for refusals to evacuate, or where there is no reply
- Maintaining of “premises checked” records
- Registration requirements Police Casualty Bureau required?
- Length of time Evacuation Cell is required – consider resilience issues
• Mutual Aid required, including a request for Military Aid

Evacuation Area
• Ascertain the perimeter of the evacuation area
• Consider sectorisation / zoning and definition of perimeter
• What specific premises to be evacuated – do any of them have internal “safe” areas e.g., providing shelter from bomb emergencies
• Time scale allowed
• Approximate numbers to be evacuated
• Security of evacuated areas
• Cordons

Method
• How will people be evacuated
• How will people be advised to evacuate – this will be time dependant
• System for recording which premises are evacuated / have been visited, a suggested “premises checked record” is attached
• If appropriate a system of marking premises that have been vacated
• Designate Evacuation Teams

Transport
• Necessary personnel and transport availability
• Specialist transport for non-ambulant people
• Safe routes from the area - can they cope with increased demand?
• Are traffic diversion measures required?
• Identify suitable evacuation assembly point(s);

Facilities
• Location of rest centres, the Local Authority will provide details of locations / facilities available
• Designate Rest Centre teams
• Requirement to set up a Logistics Cell to support the Rest / Evacuation Centres
• Facilities for evacuees (telephones, feeding, welfare, etc.)
• Provision of information at Rest Centres on the progress of the emergency

Vulnerable People
• Identify vulnerable people, given nature of emergency – if necessary set up a small cell to deal with this
• Liaise with health authorities, social services
• Consider Equality Issues
• Consider use of Rest Centres for use exclusively by vulnerable people (some Districts have pre-identified these)
• Details of messages to be given out that have been prepared for a flooding event follow, but could be amended as necessary

Briefing to Staff
• Make sure all staff are aware of the following:-
• Reasons for the evacuation
• Availability of maps
• Time scale
• Assembly point locations
• Method of evacuation and routes
• Sectors, if applicable
• Location of Rest Centre(s)

Public Information
• People must be told the reasons for evacuation, (this will have a greater impact if the message is from a “trusted source”)
• Location of Rest Centres
• Method of Evacuation
• What to bring with them (special foods, medicines)
• Arrangements for pet animals
• Security arrangements
Arrangement for famed animals
Social media
Can web sites provide real time information?
Evacuation information can be found at: http://www.norfolkprepared.gov.uk/Preparing-your-Home/What-you-can-do-before-during-and-after-an-emergency/index.htm

Reoccupation
As part of the normal response the issue of recovery will be considered from the outset.

Consider setting up a re-occupation coordinating group (led by the Local Authority) and ensure that all organisations concerned are represented. Key representatives will be:
- Category 1 and 2 Responders
- Utilities
- The Voluntary Sector, for example flood wardens
- Community Representatives

In consultation with the group, consider re-occupation of affected premises, ensuring a supervised and orderly return by evacuees. The nature of the emergency will dictate the specific needs.

Issues for consideration:
- Ensuring areas to be worked in, or returned to, are safe and warn accordingly of any likely hazards
- Likely reactions of the evacuee’s to the problems caused by any damage to their properties
- Assessing possible day / time evacuees may return to their homes or properties
- Arranging transport to their homes / properties
- Providing advice on safety aspects as far as possible, together with crime prevention advice should they subsequently decide to vacate their properties for a longer period
- Follow-up visits to the homes via social services, Police Community Support Officers or local community interest groups
- Who is to pay in relation to any costs incurred?
- Nature of any repair work necessary
- Clean up and waste disposal
• Repairs to public assets / infrastructure – schools, buildings, roads, bridges;
• If necessary restoration of power, communications and water
• Domestic and business insurance issues
• Displaced businesses
• Humanitarian assistance needs including
• Homeless / displaced residents;
• Psychological impacts
Specimen Evacuation Notice

Evacuation Notice for the Area at [Insert Parish]

As a result of the risk to life from severe coastal flooding / other threat we advise that you evacuate your property.

You should evacuate by [Insert Time] on [Insert Date]

You will be advised when it is safe to return by messages on local radio and at Rest Centres.

If you were out when police officers / flood wardens called please contact the following number to advise of your future whereabouts or evacuation intentions.

Evacuation Cell Tel no………………………………………

Radio Stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BBC Radio Norfolk.</td>
<td>95.1, 95.6 and 104.4 FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Norfolk Radio</td>
<td>96.2 and 103.2 FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart Radio</td>
<td>102.4 FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Beach Radio</td>
<td>103.4 and 97.4 FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLFM</td>
<td>96.7 FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Heart</td>
<td>96.4 and 97.1 FM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Web sites

BBC Radio Norfolk
North Norfolk Radio
Heart Radio
The Beach Radio
KLFM
Heart
Web sites
INSIDE PAGES

If evacuation becomes necessary

- Stay calm and do not panic.
- Police officers and / or other officials will try to visit all properties at risk to advise on the requirement to evacuate.
- If road conditions permit, move vehicles to unaffected areas for example higher ground and ask friends / family if you can share their parking facilities.
- You will hear about your evacuation point for transport and the location of the reception centre either verbally or by a leaflet.
- Try to check that any elderly / vulnerable family members or neighbours know about the evacuation.
- Try to inform family members / friends as to where you are evacuating.
- Listen to the advice of the authorities and follow any instructions to leave the property. Take special foods, medicines and a copy of the latest repeat prescription if possible

- Switch off gas and electricity.
- If possible, move electrical equipment and furniture upstairs.
- Any furniture that you cannot move upstairs, try to raise well off the floor.
- Do not forget to lock all doors and windows.
- Block doorways and air bricks
- Avoid walking and driving through floodwater, there could be hidden hazards.

Note: This certificate has been written assuming the Strategic Co-ordinating Group is being chaired by the police and the Recovery Co-ordinating Group is being chaired by the Local Authority

Appropriate for use when the SCG for the response feels that the conditions are right for a handover to the recovery phase.

Upon this Status Certificate being signed by both Local Authority and Police Service, the Management for dealing with the aftermath of the emergency (location)……………………………………..is to be taken over by …………………………………………………………….. Council.

In addition to any requirements laid out in specific contingency plans relevant to this emergency:

1. There is no known further risk to life in relation to this specific emergency.

2. The circumstances dictate it more appropriate for the emergency management to rest with …………………………………………………………….. Council in that the phase is clearly now one of recovery.

3. There are no serious public order or crime prevention issues which impact on the overall Strategic coordination of the recovery phase.

4. Norfolk Fire and Rescue Service together with the East of England Ambulance Service are operating at a level which does not necessitate an SCG to coordinate and facilitate their activity.

5. There are no known scenarios that may require the reinstatement of SCG in relation to this emergency in the foreseeable future.

6. ………………………………. Council is satisfied that it has in place the infrastructure and processes to take over coordination from the Police.

Signed:……………………………………. County/District/Borough/City Council
Signed........................................................................ Norfolk Constabulary

Date and Time Signed:......................................................

The signatories below have read and acknowledged the contents of this Status Certificate

........................................................................
Norfolk Fire & Rescue Service

........................................................................
East of England Ambulance Service NHS Trust
Appendix J – Command and Control Structure

**Strategic Level**

- COBR
- SAGE
- DCLG RED
- ResCG

Communication NOT Command Links

Strategic Coordinating Group

- Media Cell
- Voluntary & Faith Coordinating Cell
- Recovery Cell
- STAC
- SHA / MASHA

**Tactical Level**

Production of SITREP

Single Agency Control Rooms

NORFOLK RESILIENCE FORUM
preparing for emergencies

OFFICIAL

Page 111 of 113
Evacuation
Logistics & Support
Communications
Voluntary & Faith

Local Utilities (if available)
Traffic Management
Information
(Ensure interface with SCG)
Single Agency Silvers

Evacuation Teams
Rest Centres
Transport
Road closures/cordons